(ALE 2024) Do Better Managers Bribe Less? A Field Experiment on Management Training and Corruption in Vietnam
| Our session is aimed at answering the Agency Learning Question regarding anti-corruption, specifically offering a multisectoral approach to address regulatory bribery. We propose to present the results of a multi-pronged study that culminated in a randomized controlled trial (RCT) funded by the USAID-Laser Pulse Initiative in Vietnam. Work on the relationship between regulation and bribery generally treats businesses as victims of malfeasance by politicians or bureaucrats. In this session, we will challenge this consensus by presenting a theory of change illustrating how poorly managed firms may initiate bribes to gatekeepers either as part of a strategy to avoid regulatory compliance or because lax internal controls allow employees to independently bribe for personal gain. We will then present tests of these hypotheses, describing two linked investigations. |
